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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 950384-CA 
MARVIN JEAN JACQUES, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FQR REHEARING 
1. Did this Court, in applying the second prong of Rule 
901(b)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, properly determine that the 
non-expert witness' testimony was inadmissible because there was 
a possibility that her familiarity with defendant's handwriting 
may have been gained by looking at documents from past 
prosecutions and comparing them to documents in the present 
prosecution? 
2. Did this Court properly determine that the error in 
admitting the non-expert witness' testimony was not sufficiently 
inconsequential as to constitute harmless error? 
ARGUMENT 
PQINT ONE 
BECAUSE THE STATE ADEQUATELY 
DEMONSTRATED THAT THE NON-EXPERT'S 
FAMILIARITY WITH DEFENDANT'S 
HANDWRITING PREDATED THE PRESENT 
LITIGATION, THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT HER 
TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE 
This Court determined that Sherry Ragan, a non-expert 
witness, should not have been permitted to testify about the 
authenticity of defendant's handwriting under rule 901(b)(2) 
because the State failed to "demonstrate that Ms. Ragan's ability 
to identify defendant's handwriting predated the present 
litigation, i.e., that she did not gain such familiarity 
specifically for purposes of preparing to testify in the present 
action." Jacques, slip. op. at 6 (citations omitted).1 
1
 To support this conclusion, the Court cites two cases, 
neither of which are analogous to this case. In the first case, 
the prosecution produced a witness whom it tried unsuccessfully 
to qualify as a handwriting expert. The witness subsequently 
testified as a non-expert under rule 901(b)(2). The appellate 
court properly determined that this was error because the 
witness' familiarity with defendant's handwriting was 
unquestionably acquired Ml) after the grand jury returned the 
indictment against the appellant [by government subpoena of 
handwriting exemplars], and (2) for the sole purpose of 
testifying at Cepeda's trial." People v. Cepeda. 851 F.2d 1564, 
1567 (9th Cir. 1988). 
In the second case, a trial court refused to allow an 
attorney representing defendant in another action in another 
3 
Ragan testified at length outside the presence of the jury 











In what capacity do you know him 
[defendant]? 
Prosecuting him two or three times. 
For what cases? 
I had a case against him six or seven 
years ago for a burglary that was 
dismissed, and then prosecuted him for 
prescription fraud. 
In connection with those prosecutions, 
have you seen what you consider to be 
the defendant's handwriting? 
Yes. 
And how many documents have you seen? 
I think probably four or five, and 
letters that he's written to me and 
motions that he's filed, court documents 
that he's filed for himself in cases. 
And in connection with these documents 
state to opine about the authenticity of a signature of a witness 
in the case before the court. The appellate court upheld this 
ruling because the witness had "acquired any expertise he 
arguably had for purposes of a pending criminal investigation;" 
and because his "familiarity" consisted only of a "one-shot 
comparison" of two documents, lacking in the extent of 
familiarity contemplated by rule 901(b)(2). United States v. 
Pitts. 569 P.2d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 1978), cert, denied. 436 U.S. 
959 (1978). 
4 
and the letters written to you, have you 
had conversations with Marvin regarding 
the contents of those letters? 
Witness: Not the letters, but as to the motions 
following his filing those in court. 
Then he would appeal in court and argue 
those motions in his own behalf 
indicating he had written them. 
(R. 80-81). Ragan thus clearly testified that her familiarity 
was developed over the course of several years in which she twice 
prosecuted defendant. Based on this past familiarity, 
established by the State through this foundational testimony, 
Ragan identified State's exhibit #10 as a letter she had received 
from defendant in the course of one of the previous prosecutions 
(R. 81). She then opined that two other exhibits, a letter and 
an envelope, appeared to be in defendant's handwriting (R. 81-
82). The trial court ruled that the documents were admissible as 
a matter of law, and that Ragan was a competent non-expert 
witness (R. 90-91). The court also stated that the evidence was 
necessitated by the allegation that defendant had tried to 
disguise his handwriting in the court-ordered sample (R. 99). 
Defendant objected that Ragan was not a handwriting expert, 
that Ragan didn't see who wrote the documents, that there was no 
foundation for the writings, and that only the court-ordered 
sample should be admissible (R. 86, 90, 91). Notably, he did not 
5 
object on the ground that Ragan's familiarity with his 
handwriting was gained solely for the purposes of this 
litigation. 
In ruling that Ragan's testimony should not have been 
admitted, this Court now raises a new factual possibility: 
[Ragan's] testimony is insufficient . . . because 
it fails to dispel the possibility . . . that she 
simply pulled defendant's files from past 
prosecutions and compared his handwriting found 
therein to the handwriting on the letter and 
envelope submitted in the present prosecution, all 
for the sole purpose of testifying in this 
litigation at the request of her fellow 
prosecutor. 
Jacques. slip. op. at 6. This is an argument not presented 
below, raised by the Court sua sponte on appeal. As such, given 
Ragan's explicit foundational testimony, it should not provide a 
ground for reversal.2 ££. State v. Stegaell. 660 P.2d 252, 259 
(Utah 1983)(court will not consider issue raised for the first 
time on appeal). 
2
 Rule 901(b)(2) is silent on the Court's implication that 
refreshing one's recollection by examining a document with which 
the witness is already familiar somehow creates a fatal flaw, 
invalidating the past familiarity and replacing it with 
familiarity gained only for purposes of this litigation. 
6 
POINT TWQ 
ABSENT THE TESTIMONY OF THE NON-
EXPERT WITNESS, THE REMAINING FACTS 
DEMONSTRATE NO REASONABLE 
LIKELIHOOD OF THE JURY RETURNING A 
VERDICT MORE FAVORABLE TO DEFENDANT 
This Court determined that the trial court's error in 
admitting Sherry Ragan's authentication testimony was not 
harmless. Jacques, slip. op. at 8. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court has misconstrued the record facts. When read 
correctly, the record obviates the possibility of a more 
favorable result for defendant, even in the absence of Sherry 
Ragan' s test imony. 
First, referring to the court-ordered writing sample in 
which defendant tried to disguise his handwriting (State's 
exhibit #3), the Court states: 
After proper authentication, the State's 
expert testified that the specimen shared 18-
20 points of common identification with the 
prescription -- not enough on which to base 
an opinion that the prescription was 
definitely written by defendant. 
Jacques, slip. op. at 7. This statement, however, does not 
accurately reflect the record evidence. During the questioning 
in which Chuck Senn was being qualified as a questioned document 
examiner, the following exchange occurred: 
7 
The State: Is there a particular scale that 
you use in determining how sure you 
are about a document? 
Witness: [B]ecause it is an evaluative 
process, I try to stay between 10 
to 20 points of identification to 
be able to be highly probable or 
positive that the person did it. 
(R. 115-116) . 
Senn then testified at length about the court-ordered 
writing sample. Initially, he stated: 
From going through the writing, it was --
from doing handwriting for a long time I 
could tell there were definitely some 
capricious changes made. In other words, 
someone was fooling around with their slant 
and the way that they made things. 
(R. 133). Still referring to the court-ordered sample, he 
continued, "However, we still leave things behind. We still 
leave points. And in going through it, I came up with -- I think 
it was around 18 to 20 points that I knew I had from this" (Id.). 
The prosecutor then directly questioned Senn about the 
authorship of the court-ordered sample: 
The State: So you indicated you found 18 to 20 
points of similarity between this 
document, State's exhibit 3, and the 
prescription; is that correct? 
Witness: That's correct. 
The State: So from that document what is your --
8 
where does that fall in your certainty 
level? 
Witness: It would be my opinion that all of these 
documents were written by the same 
individual. 
(R. 134). Consistent with Senn's expert opinion and contrary to 
this Court's conclusion, the 18-20 points of identification in 
the court-ordered sample provided a sufficient basis for his 
opinion that the prescription was definitely written by 
defendant. 
Second, in its opinion, the Court also states: 
Had Ms. Ragan been precluded from authenticating 
the writings at issue, the expert would have been 
left with only the problematic court-ordered 
sample to compare with the prescription. Although 
the court-ordered sample contained 18-20 points of 
common identification with the prescription, it 
was not nearly as incriminating as the comparison 
with the samples authenticated by Ms. Ragan, which 
contained all 32 possible points of common 
identification. Thus, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury would have returned a 
verdict in favor of defendant in the absence of 
Ms. Ragan's testimony and the resulting evidence. 
Jacques, slip op. at 8 (footnote omitted). While the Court is 
correct in recognizing that 32 points of identification may be 
more incriminating than 18-20 points, that statement does not 
undercut the expert's testimony that the lesser number of points 
9 
was sufficient for a positive identification.3 Indeed, Senn 
testified, "Again, depending upon how strong of points we find, 
10 to 20 is normally what I would use for positive 
identification. Doing 32, obviously someone might say, overkill 
[sic]. But there's alot of writing here that can be used for 
identification" (R. 131). 
Senn's testimony was consistent. He never veered from his 
opinion that the court-ordered sample was written by defendant. 
While he chose to focus for comparison purposes on the documents 
Ragan authenticated, rather than on the court-ordered sample, he 
did so for reasons of practicality and efficiency: 
With all of the capricious changes in here 
[the court-ordered sample] it would be very 
difficult for me to sit up there and for the 
lay person to look at it and say, yeah, these 
were made by the same person. I can tell you 
that as an expert, but to try and prove it to 
you, it was definitely a lot better to use 
the natural handwriting. 
(R. 134). That the court-ordered sample was problematic did not, 
however, undermine Senn's opinion that it was written by the same 
person who wrote the prescription. The following exchange on 
redirect examination clarifies Senn's unwavering position: 
3
 By analogy, one might be more pregnant at eight months 
than at one month, but that does not render a pregnancy at one 
month any less real. 
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The State: Is there any question in your mind that 
State's exhibit #3 [the court-ordered 
sample], which the defendant wrote, is 
the same handwriting as written on the 
Percocet prescription? 
Wit, nP-5P • N^ RIT" 
The State: Now, when you say you couldn't prove it 
••:' to a jury, aren't you in fact saying it 
would be difficult to put it: on the 
board? 
Witness: Sure. 
The State: When you look at these handwriting 
samples you use a microscope and that to 
establish the same points you showed on 
the board here today? 
Witness: Yes. 
: And is it expensiv e t :: :::3 : € at:e • :: ei I leads 
from a microscope? 
Witness: Yes, They have to be photographed first 
and then go from there. 
The State: So when you say you couldn't prove it t, : • 
a jury, you're saying it's easier to 
demonstrate on the board wi th the other 
samples? 
Witness: That's correct 
11 
The State: But it's your opinion there was a 
positive match, in the high seventy 
category,4 with this handwriting sample 
to the handwriting sample on the 
prescription? 
Witness: That would be my opinion. 
(R. 148-49). Thus, absent the documents Ragan authenticated, the 
State still had a positive identification between the court-
ordered writing sample and the questioned prescription. Senn's 
expert testimony definitively matching the court-ordered writing 
sample with the questioned prescription provided the crucial link 
in the testimony necessary to convict defendant. Notably, 
defendant did not produce a rebuttal witness to dispute Senn's 
testimony. 
Furthermore, even if the evidence that came in through 
Sherry Ragan is discounted, the remaining evidence must still be 
construed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. In 
reciting the circumstantial evidence adduced by the State, the 
Court has misconstrued one other relevant fact. The Court opines 
*that defendant possibly had the opportunity to obtain blank 
prescription pads" and, in a footnote, adds that the room in 
which defendant was examined whad contained blank prescription 
4
 This term was never explained, nor does it appear 
anywhere else in the record. 
12 
pads, perhaps including some in the name of his associate, Dr. 
Olsen." Jacques, slip. op. at 8 & n.5 (emphasis added). 
The Court's use of the qualifiers ''possibly" and "perhaps" 
I II IN ill \ ! I 1 J d i l l I l I I ' I I l i \ * i i i | I  I I l i d t t J III I d I I I | I I , K I i J - I N I 'in1,1 I 11 
practiced with the doctor whose name appeared on the forged 
prescription, testified that he saw defendant in the Ephraim 
c] :i i 3 :ii c DII the da} before the forged presor i pf ion w ,i :i t fdin:if:,i M , 
that prescription pads were left unsupervised in the clinic 
i , . defendant w as al oi m • i r i I::l le 
examination room before the doctor examined him
 Viv. ,^f ,*. 7J/ . 
Based on this evidence, there was more than a possible 
opp :i):ii : t'i :i n :ii tr;,, £ : •] : defendant it :: :: bta :i i i a 1: •] an: ill :: prescr 
In addition, each doctor does not have his or her own 
personal prescription pads, as the opinion infers. A cursory-
examination of the forged prescription reveals that all oi the 
clinic's doctors at all locations are named on the prescription 
pad,1. ii*j£ al li " " " " ,
 lM \ , > , i\ " , n i a I My 
examination room would necessarily not "perhaps1" have had 
Dr. Olsen's name on -ii-
xiic State's case was further strengthened by fin li I i ni 
*f *" employees in the pharmacy where defendant tendered the 
"I i 1 :m :i 1 € :ine i II, II11 -1 t•"i}-1 */1 I 11ess cL»i,i,1 d p o s i t i v e l y ldentify 
defendant, they provided strong circumstantial corroboration 
through physical descriptions of the individual and his 
distinctive cherry red sports car (R. 44-45, 49-50). 
Apart from the testimony and evidence that came in through 
Sherry Ragan, the State adduced evidence on all elements of the 
crime for which defendant was convicted. Accordingly, even 
omitting the Ragan testimony, and construing the remaining 
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, there 
is simply no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for 
defendant. £££ State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the State asks this Court to modify 
its opinion to conform with the record evidence and to affirm 
defendant's conviction. Pursuant to rule 35(a), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the State certifies that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for purposes of delay. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this H^day of October, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ORME, Presiding Judge: 
Defendant Marvin J. Jacques appeals his conviction for 
uttering a forged prescription He contends the trial court 
erroneously admitted nonexpert opinion testimony of the 
genuineness of handwriting claimed to be his. We reverse 
defendant•s conviction and remand for a new trial. 
FACTS 
On September 2 7, 1994, an individual entered the Art city 
Pharmacy in Springville, Utah, seeking to fill a prescription for 
the narcotic, Percocet. The prescription was made out to James 
Brooks and signed by Dr. Darrel Olsen. Being suspicious of the 
spelling "Percoceth" in the prescription, the pharmacist's 
assistant asked her supervisor, to look at the prescription. 
Attempts were made to contact Dr. Olsen to verify the 
prescription, but to no avail. The police department was 
subsequently contacted,: but officers arrived after the customer 
had left the pharmacy.- :'-The police learned from witnesses at the 
pharmacy that the customer*was an African-American male, 
approximately 6!2" tal], and drove a small red sports car. 
Defendant Jacques was subsequently arrested and charged with 
uttering a forged prescription in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8 (4) (a) (iii) (1996), a third degree felony. At trial, the 
State tried to connect defendant to the forged prescription in 
several ways. In addition to showing that defendant had been in 
the office of Dr. Olsen's partner on the previous day, met the 
general description of the customer who presented the 
prescription, and drove a red sports car, the State adduced the 
testimony of two handwriting witnesses. The first of these 
witnesses, an expert in comparative handwriting, administered a 
court-ordered handwriting exercise to defendant. At trial, this 
expert testified that he could not state conclusively, on the 
basis of the court-ordered specimen, whether the prescription was 
written by defendant. The expert opined that the specimen had 
been deliberately written to be at variance with defendant's 
usual penmanship. 
The second handwriting witness was Sherry Ragan, a Utah 
County prosecutor with no expertise in the area of handwriting 
analysis. Ms. Ragan offered her opinion concerning the 
genuineness of defendant's handwriting in several documents 
allegedly penned and addressed by defendant to the prosecutor's 
office and to the trial court in the course of the present 
litigation. After hearing Ms. Raganfs testimony, the trial court 
found the writings to be authentic and admitted them into 
evidence. These supposedly authenticated samples of defendant's 
handwriting were later compared by the handwriting expert to the 
handwriting on the forged prescription. On the basis of these 
samples, the expert was able to testify conclusively that the 
forged prescription was written by defendant. 
The jury returned its verdict of guilty, and the trial court 
sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not 
to exceed five years. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence, we 
apply several standards of review. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 
1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993). See also State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 
774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991) (stating that several standards of review 
must be employed given that the trial court's determination of 
admissibility involves both legal and factual conclusions). In 
determining whether the trial court properly admitted the opinion 
of a nonexpert for authentication purposes, a matter governed by 
Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, we first apply a 
correction of error standard to the legal content of that 
decision. See State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah App.) 
(applying correctness standard io issue of whether trial court 
properly excluded photograph of car trunk), cert, denied. 857 
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r T j g 4 8 (utah iyyi^ _ i n maj<:ing this determination, "we i i • 
(11 whether the trial court selected the correct rule of 
evidence, (2) whether the trial court correctly interpreted that 
rule, and (3) whether the trial court correctly applied the 
rule. " IdL at ?n 
Aiter reviewing the trial court's legal decision tor 
correctness, we apply an abuse of discretion standard in 
determining whether the trial court reasonably determined the 
nonexpert witness properly authenticated the writing samples 
pursuant to Rule 901. Id. at 714. Even if we find error in the 
decision to admit evidence, such decision does not result in 
reversible error unless the error is prejudicial. See State v. 
Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 957 (Utah App. 1993), flff'd, 889 P.2d 
419 (Ufah 199S) . 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
We ntud decide whether the trial court erred xn admitting 
the testimony of a nonexpert to authenticate handwriting samples, 
when the witness had not personally observed the actual writinq 
of such samples. Beyond this threshold question, defendant 
contends the State failed to adequately prove the nonexpert's 
familiarity with defendant's handwriting and the origin of that 
familiarity, as required by Rule 901(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The State counters that the origin of the nonexpert's 
familiarity with defendant's handwriting was sufficiently proven 
to support a finding of admissibility, and that, in any event, 
any errcr in permitting the challenged testimony was harmless. 
AUTHENTICATION UNDER RULE 901(b)(2) 
The general rule governing the admissibility oi writings or 
other documentary evidence is that the proponent, prior to 
introducing such evidence, must first authenticate the evidence 
by showing that it is what the proponent claims it to be. Utah 
R. Evid. 901(a); State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). This process of 
authentication must be distinguished from a finding of 
authenticity. Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 
Evidence § 9.2, at 1124 (1995). In their recent treatise, 
Mueller and Kirkpatrick explain that the process of 
authentication "deals with the foundation required for 
admitting evidence, and the adequacy of that foundation is 
determined by the trial judge." Id. They also state that 
although the jury is ultimately responsible for determining 
whether the evidence is.in fact authentic once the evidence is 
admitted, the court must, fulfill its screening function under 
950384-CA 3 
Rule 104(b),1 which requires the trial court "to assess whether 
there is evidence sufficient to support a jury finding of 
authenticity." Id. at 1124 (citations omitted). See also State 
v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991) (distinguishing trial 
court's role in making "any necessary preliminary factual 
findings" in order to reach legal conclusions concerning 
admissibility of evidence from jury's role in crediting or 
discrediting admitted evidence); Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. 
Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 1-27 (1996)(stating resolution of fact 
questions surrounding admissibility generally entrusted to 
judge). 
Utah Rule of Evidence 901(b) provides, by way of 
illustration, several possible methods for authenticating a 
writing. Specifically, Rule 901(b)(2) provides that a trial 
court may allow a nonexpert witness to state an opinion as to the 
authenticity of handwriting, provided that two requirements are 
satisfied: first, that the witness is shown to be familiar with 
the handwriting, and second, that it is established the witness's 
familiarity was not gained for purposes of the litigation.2 
1. Rule 104(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as 
follows: 
Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the 
relevancy of evidence depends upon the 
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court 
shall admit it upon, or subject to, the 
introduction of evidence sufficient to 
support a finding of the fulfillment of the 
condition. 
2. Rule 901 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows 
(a) General provision. The requirement 
of authentication or identification as a 
condition precedent to admissibility is 
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the matter in question is what 
its proponent claims. 
(b) Illustrations. By way of 
illustration only, and not by way of 
limitation, the following are examples of 
authentication or identification conforming 
with the requirements of this rule: 
• • • • 
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. 
Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of 
handwriting/ Based'^ upfen familiarity not 
acquired for purposes of the litigation. 
950384-CA 4 
As to the first requirement, it is inconsequential for the 
trial court's determination whether the nonexpert has personally 
observed the person put pen to paper or exactly how many times 
the nonexpert has actually seen the person's handwriting; such 
facts go only to the weight accorded the evidence by the jury. 
See, e.g., United States v, Binzel, 907 F.2d 746, 749 (7th cir. 
1990). QL^ State v. Freshwater. 30 Utah 442, 447, 85 P. 447, 448 
(1906) (stating it is "settled that no great degree of 
familiarity with handwriting is required to render a witness 
competent to give an opinion. If he has seen the person write a 
single time, it has generally been held sufficient.") (citation 
omitted). 
Although there is no requirement that the nonexpert 
personally observe the act of writing, Rule 901(b)(2) does 
require that the nonexpert have an adequate familiarity with the 
person's handwriting. The adequacy of familiarity may be present 
"'if [the witness] has seen writings purporting to be those of 
the person in question under circumstances indicating their 
genuineness.'" United States v. Standing Soldier, 538 F.2d 196, 
202 (8th Cir.) (quoting Edward W. Cleary, McCormick'S Handbook Qt 
the Law of Evidence § 221, at 547 (2d ed. 1972)), cert, denied/ 
429 U.S. 1025 (1976). 
The second requirement under Rule 901(b)(2) mandates that 
any familiarity with the person's handwriting not have been 
obtained for purposes of the present litigation. See People v. 
CfiCSda, 851 F.2d 1564, 1566-67 (9th Cir. 1988)(holding rule was 
violated when witness's familiarity with defendant's handwriting 
was acquired after indictment was returned and for sole purpose 
of testifying at defendant's trial). See also United States v. 
Pitts. 569 F.2d 343, 348 (5th Cir.)(affirming trial court's 
exclusion of nonexpert's opinion concerning signature on a 
receipt when nonexpert made "one-shot" comparison with a genuine 
signature for purposes of pending criminal investigation), cert. 
denied. 436 U.S. 959 (1978). Under the second prong of 
901(b)(2), a nonexpert may not offer an opinion as to the 
genuineness of handwriting if it is established that the witness 
gained familiarity for purposes of testifying in an action in 
which the handwriting is at issue. In other words, the witness's 
familiarity with the handwriting must predate the present 
litigation. 
In the instant case, the nonexpert called to authenticate 
the writings at issue was Ms. Ragan, an attorney in the very 
office that was prosecuting defendant. Ms. Ragan began her 
testimony out of the jury's presence by stating that she knew 
defendant from past contact with him. Ms. Ragan testified that 
she had seen defendant's handwriting in certain documents he 
filed with the trial cotyrt. ifc. past prosecutions. Ms. Ragan was 
then shown two writings: a letter written to the prosecutor in 
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the present action and the envelope in which the letter was sent. 
Upon being shown these items, Ms. Ragan offered her opinion that 
the handwriting contained in the letter and on the envelope was 
that of defendant.3 
As a whole, Ms. Ragan1s testimony indicates that she met the 
first prong of Rule 901(b)(2), even though she had never 
witnessed defendant in the act of writing. Her testimony 
establishes that she did possess some degree of familiarity with 
defendant's handwriting. Although Ms. Ragan demonstrated her 
general familiarity with defendant's handwriting, her testimony 
wholly fails to satisfy the second prong of Rule 901(b)(2). 
To satisfy this second prong, the prosecution had to 
demonstrate that Ms. Ragan1s ability to identify defendant's 
handwriting predated the present litigation, i.e., that she did 
not gain such familiarity specifically for purposes of preparing 
to testify in the present action. Se$ Cepeda, 851 F.2d at 1567; 
Pittsr 569 F.2d at 348. Her testimony is insufficient in this 
respect because it fails to dispel the possibility--especially 
distinct given the fact that she works as a deputy county 
attorney who has prosecuted defendant in the past--that she 
simply pulled defendant's files from past prosecutions and 
compared his handwriting found therein to the handwriting on the 
letter and envelope submitted in the present prosecution, all for 
the sole purpose of testifying in this litigation at the request 
of her fellow prosecutor. 
Accordingly, given the deficiency in Ms. Ragan's testimony, 
we must conclude that the court erred in admitting the letter and 
envelope which were then used by the expert for purposes of 
comparison with the forged prescription. 
HARMLESS ERROR 
We must still decide whether the trial court's error in 
admitting Ms. Ragan's authentication testimony was harmless. The 
doctrine of harmless error applies to "'errors which, although 
properly preserved below and presented on appeal, are 
sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no 
3. Ms. Ragan later testified to her opinion in the presence of 
the jury, but was careful not to disclose that she had prosecuted 
defendant on prior occasions'. 'Ms. Ragan testified that she was a 
local attorney who knew defendant from unspecified prior dealings 
and that she was familiar with defendant's handwriting. Again, 
over defendant's objection, the trial court allowed Ms. Ragan to 
state her opinion that the- handwriting in the envelope and letter 
belonged to defendant. 
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reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings.1" State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 957-58 (Utah 
App. 1993) (quoting State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 
1989)), aff'd. 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 1995). For an error to require 
reversal, "the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." State 
v. Kniaht. 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). 
In determining whether reversal is required, several factors 
are considered, including lf,the importance of the witnesses] 
testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was 
cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence co[rro]borating 
or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, 
the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of 
course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case.1" State 
v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 205 (Utah 1987) (quoting Delaware v. 
Van Arsdall. 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1438 (1986)). 
In the instant case, the prosecution attempted to connect 
defendant to the forged prescription by showing the jury, through 
expert testimony, that the handwriting in several past letters 
and documents allegedly penned by defendant was the same as the 
handwriting in the forged prescription. The first proffered 
sample of defendant's handwriting was the specimen ordered by the 
trial court prior to trial. The specimen contained letters of 
the alphabet and various words, all written by defendant. After 
proper authentication, the State's expert testified that the 
specimen shared 18-20 points of common identification with the 
prescription--not enough on which to base an opinion that the 
prescription was definitely written by defendant. 
The second sample of handwriting used for comparison by the 
expert consisted of the items analyzed by Ms. Ragan. After Ms. 
Ragan's purported authentication of these writings and their 
admission into evidence, the State's expert testified that all 32 
points of common identification were present. Therefore, the 
expert concluded that the handwriting in the documents 
authenticated by Ms. Ragan and the handwriting in the forged 
prescription definitely belonged to the same person, namely 
defendant. 
Thus, Ms. Ragan was a critical witness for the State. Her 
testimony led to the admission into evidence of the very 
handwriting samples which allowed the State's expert to make a 
conclusive comparison with the forged prescription. The jury 
also heard her state she was"familiar with defendant's writing 
and that the letter and envelope considered by the expert 
appeared to have been written by defendant. Finally, her 
testimony enabled the jury to conduct its own comparison of the 
handwriting in the forged prescription and in the specimens she 
authenticated. See Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(3) (allowing trier of 
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fact to make its own comparison with authenticated specimens of 
handwriting). Had Ms. Ragan been precluded from authenticating 
the writings at issue, the expert would have been left with only 
the problematic court-ordered sample to compare with the 
prescription. Although the court-ordered sample contained 18-20 
points of common identification with the prescription, it was not 
nearly as incriminating as the comparison with the samples 
authenticated by Ms. Ragan, which contained all 32 possible 
points of common identification. Thus, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury would have returned a verdict in favor 
of defendant in the absence of Ms. Ragan's testimony and the 
resulting evidence.4 Therefore, we cannot conclude that the 
court's error in admitting Ms. Ragan's testimony was sufficiently 
inconsequential as to constitute harmless error. 
This conclusion is especially compelling in view of the 
overall strength of the State's case. The State presented the 
testimony of several other witnesses. Although these witnesses 
testified that they saw a male resembling defendant in the 
pharmacy on the day in question, and that defendant possibly had 
the opportunity to obtain blank prescription pads,5 none of these 
witnesses could make a positive identification of defendant as 
the person passing the forged prescription. 
CONCLUSION 
Before allowing Ms. Ragan to provide authentication 
testimony on the samples of defendant's handwriting, the trial 
court should have required testimony as to the origin of Ms. 
4. It should be noted that appellate courts are especially 
reluctant to find errors harmless when they concern opinions 
given by experts, see, e.g.. State v. Iora. 801 P.2d 938, 941-42 
(Utah App. 1990), given the perception that jurors tend to give 
great weight to such testimony. Although Ms. Ragan was not 
herself an expert, her authentication testimony paved the way for 
the expert's ultimate opinion that defendant forged the 
prescription, the single most incriminating part of the State's 
case. 
5. The State presented the testimony of Dr. Bateman. Dr. 
Bateman testified that on September 26, 1994, he had treated 
defendant for a sprained knee and prescribed defendant "Lodine," 
an anti-inflammatory drug.. Dr: Bateman testified that at the 
time of this treatment, defendant had been left alone in the 
examination room for a few minutes, which is customary in the 
doctor's office, and that the room had contained blank 
prescription pads, perhaps.including some in the name of his 
associate, Dr. Olsen. 
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Ragan's familiarity with defendant's handwriting, and, in 
particular, whether it was acquired for purposes of this 
litigation. Because Ms. Ragan's testimony is completely lacking 
in this regard, the trial court erred in admitting Ms. Ragan's 
authentication testimony and related evidence. This error was 
not harmless. Therefore, we reverse defendant's conviction and 





Pamela T. Greenwood, Judc ge 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
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